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OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
Adjunct Professor Robert Kenny substituted for Professor Susan Denbo while she was 
on sabbatical. After an arbitration, he was suspended for borrowing her syllabus. Kenny’s 
borrowing resulted from an excusable misunderstanding. Only later did evidence come out 
that Denbo had passed along that syllabus specifically for the adjunct to use. But the una-
vailability of certain evidence at the arbitration does not justify rescinding his settlement.†  
I. 
A. Requesting and Receiving a Syllabus. For sixteen years, Kenny taught accounting 
and business law as an adjunct professor at Rider University in New Jersey. Denbo taught 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
† Kenny appeared pro se and argued his case before us. His argument was reasoned and 
helpful to the Court. 
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Legal and Ethical Aspects of Management. In the fall of 2011, Rider hired Kenny to teach 
that course the next spring, when Denbo was to go on sabbatical. In preparation for her 
sabbatical, Denbo gave her syllabus to department chair Ira Sprotzer to share with the ad-
junct who would fill in for her. 
At Kenny’s request, Sprotzer gave Kenny a hard copy of the syllabus. Kenny thought 
that Sprotzer had pulled the copy from his files. He did not know, and learned only in 
discovery in this lawsuit, that Denbo had given that syllabus to Sprotzer to share.  
Kenny also visited Rider’s Blackboard website, where faculty post course materials, 
and downloaded a copy of the syllabus from Denbo’s web page. Denbo’s Blackboard set-
tings, which were not the default, let guests access her other course materials as well, in-
cluding student resources and assignments. But Kenny did not download or share them. He 
tweaked the syllabus’s grading scale, but otherwise kept the readings, sequence, and as-
signments verbatim. Then he uploaded the syllabus to the spring 2012 course module.  
The week before classes started, Kenny called Denbo to ask permission to use some of 
the student resources listed in the syllabus and available on her Blackboard site. Respond-
ing by email, she complained that it was “[u]nbelievable!!!!!” that his syllabus was all but 
identical to hers. DA 86. She also asked how he had accessed her materials and which 
materials students might have seen. 
Kenny explained that he could access the materials through Blackboard and that, if she 
wished, he would “change everything including the homeworks.” DA 82. She wished, so 
he reworked the syllabus, did not post any of her student resources, and did not use her 
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assignments. In an effort to appease her, Kenny also apologized and assured her it would 
never happen again. 
Nonetheless, Denbo was “outraged!!!!!” by all this. DA 86. In a series of emails to 
Rider administrators, she accused Kenny of “EXTREME unethical behavior,” fuming that 
he had accessed “MY ENTIRE BLACKBOARD!!!” using the guest access permitted by 
her Blackboard privacy settings. DA 99. Denbo also fulminated that Kenny’s syllabus “is 
IDENTICAL to my syllabus and references all of my Blackboard materials.” Id. In follow-
up emails, she continued her tirade, deploying such punctuation-peppered interjections as 
“UGH!!!!” and “REALLY?????????” DA 102, 105. Even though she conceded that “he 
assured me that he had not posted anything yet,” she suggested that Kenny never teach at 
Rider again. DA 99-100. 
B. Unprecedented Discipline for Borrowing a Provided Syllabus. Rider acceded to 
Denbo’s request. For the first time at Rider (as far as we know), an adjunct professor was 
disciplined for using a syllabus given to him by his department chair for a course that he 
was hired to substitute teach. As the Union grievance officer testified, in his thirty-eight 
years at Rider, he had never seen syllabi posted with attribution. And Sprotzer conceded 
that he had never heard of any university where adjuncts were given syllabi but needed to 
seek further permission to use them. App. 315-16. He also admitted that Rider developed 
its unwritten policy against such borrowing only after Kenny’s arbitration. App. 298-99, 
315. 
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Rider’s Dean sent Kenny a letter charging him with “serious unprofessional conduct” 
and suspending him for the summer and fall of 2012. DA 55. Under the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement, the Union appealed that discipline to the Provost on Kenny’s behalf. 
As the Union’s letter explained, Kenny had “reasonabl[y] but inaccurate[ly] assum[ed]” 
that, because Denbo made her course materials available to guests on Blackboard, she had 
given implied permission to use them. DA 61. The Provost rejected these arguments and 
sustained the discipline. 
C. Nondisclosure in Arbitration. Kenny’s discipline went to arbitration. The Union 
was not allowed to depose witnesses, but it asked for all materials collected during the 
Provost’s investigation, including correspondence, emails, and Blackboard records. 
The arbitration itself was never completed. The arbitrator took no evidence or testi-
mony. After Rider’s opening statement, and ten minutes into the Union’s opening, the ar-
bitrator cut off the Union’s lawyer and held a sidebar conference. When the Union’s lawyer 
returned from that conference, he relayed to Kenny and to the Rider faculty’s Union rep-
resentative that the arbitrator “wanted to see a settlement,” and “gave a broad outline” of 
the sort of agreement the arbitrator had in mind. DA 277. According to the Union’s lawyer, 
the arbitrator felt that any settlement “needed to include [Kenny’s] suspension.” Id. 
The Union’s lawyer came back to Kenny with a proposed settlement and presented it 
as a fait accompli. Kenny signed it. As part of the settlement, he apologized in writing to 
Denbo and accepted a suspension for the fall of 2012. Neither side admitted wrongdoing. 
Since then, Rider has not offered Kenny any teaching assignments. When Kenny applied 
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for unemployment compensation, Rider told the state authorities that Kenny had been sus-
pended for misconduct. So his application was denied. 
D. Discovery Surfaced During This Suit. Kenny filed this suit in New Jersey state 
court. He alleged that Denbo had libeled him by claiming that he had used her syllabus 
without permission and that Rider had breached the settlement agreement by reporting his 
suspension to the state. In discovery, three previously undisclosed emails came out. And 
in depositions, both Denbo and Sprotzer admitted that Denbo had given Sprotzer the hard 
copy of the syllabus so that Sprotzer could give it to Kenny. But neither Sprotzer nor Denbo 
testified that Kenny was authorized to copy or to teach directly from Denbo’s syllabus. 
Kenny then added a fraud count, seeking to rescind the arbitration settlement. And after 
Kenny discovered emails in which Denbo questioned why the Union was defending Kenny, 
he added a claim against the Union for breaching its duty of fair representation. 
The Union removed this case to federal court, and all defendants moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all counts. 
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. DiFiore v. CSL Behring, LLC, 879 
F.3d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 2018). 
II. 
Although Rider’s and Denbo’s behavior was perhaps overheated and uncalled for in 
light of the actual conduct at issue, no reasonable juror could find that it crossed the line 
into legal wrongs. 
A. Fraud. Though Rider did not produce three emails before arbitration, that fact can-
not support either Kenny’s legal or equitable fraud claim. Both torts require a material 
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misrepresentation. Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253, 260 (N.J. 2005); 
Liebling v. Garden State Indem., 767 A.2d 515, 518 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). But 
Kenny has produced no evidence that could justify a jury in finding a misrepresentation 
here. Not turning over the three emails in question could amount to one only if Rider had 
an obligation to do so. And while New Jersey does recognize that “[s]ilence in the face of 
a duty to disclose may constitute a fraudulent concealment,” it imposes such a duty only in 
limited circumstances. See United Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 704 A.2d 38, 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1997). This is not a case involving—at least as between Kenny and his em-
ployer—“fiduciary relationships such as principal and agent.” Id. at 44.  
Nor are settlement negotiations the kind of “transactions which in their essential nature, 
are intrinsically fiduciary, and necessarily call for perfect good faith and full disclosure.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). In other circumstances, the New Jer-
sey courts have declined to find a quasi-fiduciary relationship when the parties act “at arms-
length, . . . in their own interest,” and stand in “essentially adversarial” positions. Id. at 44-
45 (discussing lender-borrower negotiations). All of these qualities are present in a labor 
arbitration conducted, like this one, between sophisticated parties represented by counsel. 
New Jersey also recognizes, however, that in some circumstances “the nature of [the 
parties’] dealings, or their position towards each other,” “necessarily implie[s]” a level of 
“trust and confidence” that creates a duty to disclose. Id. at 44 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). And perhaps, as Kenny argues, the informal discovery that the parties engaged 
in leading up to the arbitration was such a situation. See Kenny Br. 26 (“[A]fter agreeing 
to discovery it was incumbent upon the University to proceed honestly and in good faith.”).  
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Even if New Jersey law would imply such a duty here, it could hardly extend any further 
than obligating Rider to respond in good faith to the discovery requests that the Union 
actually made. If Rider’s duty to disclose arose from the Union’s request for documents, 
then that duty could have extended only as far as disclosing all the documents that were 
actually responsive, namely those that the Provost collected in deciding to uphold Kenny’s 
discipline. As Rider and Denbo point out, the Union’s grievance officer testified under oath 
that he was unaware of any responsive documents that the Provost held back. Given the 
limited scope of the Union’s request, Kenny must present evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that the Provost collected those three emails during the disciplinary process. Be-
cause Kenny has marshalled no such evidence, he cannot prove a misrepresentation and 
his fraud claims cannot survive. 
B. Libel. Kenny’s libel claim likewise fails. The District Court arguably erred in find-
ing that Denbo’s statements were mere opinion rather than factual. But “[w]e can affirm 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on any basis supported by the record.” 
United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 753 (3d Cir. 2017). 
Denbo’s complaints to administrators fall within a qualified privilege for reporting em-
ployees’ conduct to their supervisors. Feggans v. Billington, 677 A.2d 771, 775-77 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). Denbo sincerely believed that Kenny’s conduct amounted to 
plagiarism, so her statement was not knowingly false. And her mistake about Kenny’s per-
mission does not amount to reckless disregard of the truth. See id. at 777. She did not give 
the syllabus directly to him and was not completely unreasonable in believing that passing 
it along to Sprotzer did not authorize verbatim copying. That is particularly true because 
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the Collective Bargaining Agreement recognized syllabi as intellectual property. No rea-
sonable juror could find otherwise. So the statements are privileged, not libelous. 
C. Breach of Contract. Kenny claims that Rider breached its settlement contract by 
telling a partial truth. Rider told the unemployment-compensation authorities that it had 
suspended Kenny for misconduct at work. He asserts that Rider should also have explained 
that he had not admitted guilt. But nothing in the settlement agreement required Rider to 
say anything more. 
D. Duty of Fair Representation. Finally, Kenny claims that the Union breached its 
duty of fair representation. That claim is time-barred. Under 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), such 
claims must be brought within six months of the breach. Here, Kenny added Count Four 
more than four years after the arbitration. Nor does equitable tolling apply. The Union did 
not actively conceal Denbo’s email, and its reply evinces its commitment to represent him 
vigorously.  
* * * * * 
As the District Court suggested, Kenny had to endure not only the “outrage[ ] !!!!!” of 
tenured Professor Denbo, but also a “University [that] overreacted . . . in order to placate 
[that] overwrought tenured professor.” App. 33; DA 86. Regardless of how one judges the 
propriety of their behavior, they did not violate the law. So we must affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
